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THE ROAD FROM NOWHERE? 
PUNITIVE DAMAGE RATIOS AFTER BMW v. 
GORE AND STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE CO. v. CAMPBELL 
Andrew C. W. Lund' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since at least 1996 when the Supreme Court decided BMW 
of North America, Inc. v. Gore,' lower courts' reviews of punitive 
damage awards have officially included a review of the ratio 
between the punitive award and the underlying compensatory 
award. Yet, this ratio's role in these courts' analyses has often 
been very weak. This was not necessarily a fault of BMW, which 
was merely grounded in a concern for fair notice to defendants. In 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. C~mpbel l ,~  
however, that rationale changed, and with that change, the 
weakness of ratios has become problematic. 
In BMW, the Court reaffirmed that an excessive punitive 
damage award may violate due process and, for the first time, held 
that a punitive damage award's excessiveness violated due 
- -  
' B.A., 1999, with honors, Swarthmore College; J.D., 2002, cum laude, New 
York University School of Law. I thank Bany Friedman, Margo Kaplan and 
William Nelson for their comments and suggestions during the preparation of 
this article. Special thanks to my wife, Anne, for all of her help and support. 
' 5 17 U.S. 559 (1996). 
538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
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process.' Most famously, BMW set forth a non-exclusive list of 
three "guideposts" to direct courts in their determinations of 
unconstitutional excessi~eness.~ Among these three was the 
reasonableness of the ratio between a punitive damage award and 
the underlying compensatory award.6 Indeed, much of the 
academic debate surrounding punitive damages, both before and 
after BMW, concerned such  ratio^.^ But despite the fact that BMW 
described the ratio between punitive and compensatory awards as 
an important part of the analysis, later judicial review of such 
awards often overlooked or marginalized ratios. 
This marginalization of ratios, far from being exogenous to 
BMW, was a product of certain provisos of the "guidepost" 
framework the case established for determining the 
unconstitutionality of punitive damage awards. These provisos left 
lower courts with the distinct impression that ratios between 
punitive and compensatory damages were to be of little help in 
determining excessiveness. Faced with these instructions, the ratio 
guidepost was doomed to fail with respect to constraining punitive 
4 See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp. v. 
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 
U.S. 1 (1991); Browning-Ferris lndus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 
257 (1989). 
5 See BMW, 5 17 U.S. at 575. 
Id. 
7 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Predictability of 
Punitive Damages Awards in Published Opinions, the Impact of BMW v. Gore 
on Punitive Damage Awards, and Forecasting Which Punitive Awards Will Be 
Reduced, 7 S. CT. ECON. REV. 59 (1999); Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages 
and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421 (1998); A. Mitchell 
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 1 1  1 
HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal 
Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347 (2003). 
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Although the caveats often rendered ratios ineffective, that 
ineffectiveness was not inconsistent with BMWs limited 
constitutional concern - fair notice to defendants. Justice 
Stevens' majority opinion in BMW declared: "Elementary notions. 
of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that 
a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will 
subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty 
that a State may impose."' But "fair notice" does not require 
mathematical certainty or anything close to it. Nor does it 
necessarily mean that a jury may not be arbitrary or capricious in 
'reaching its decision. Such was ratio's happy, albeit ineffective, 
position after BMW. 
The ineffectiveness of ratios only became problematic 
when State Farm modified its underlying rationale, espousing the 
more robust concept of "non-arbitrariness." That modification 
should have resulted in a stronger role for punitive-to- 
compensatory ratios, because the BMW guideposts, without a 
strong concern for ratio, did not necessarily constrain juries' 
arbitrariness. But State Farm failed to clearly break from those 
provisos in BMW that had undercut ratios' power. As a result, 
what had been merely an ineffective guidepost under BMW 
metastasized into an internally inconsistent doctrine under State 
Farm. Now, not only are lower courts after State Farm confused 
with respect .to ratio's import, this confusion is, for the first time, 
BMW, 5 17 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added). 
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problematic vis-a-vis the underlying constitutional issue. 
Part I1 offers a brief introduction to BMW and its immediate 
aftermath. After the decision was handed down in 1996, scholars 
found that punitive damage award ratios were still arbitrary. In 
Part 111, one hypothesis given to explain this result - that not 
enough time had elapsed since BMW to allow lower courts to come 
to grips with its lessons - is examined and dismissed after 
observing how post-BMW courts continued to give shape to the 
guideposis well beyond 1996. Part IV offers a different 
hypothesis, which better explains why punitive damage awards 
behaved arbitrarily. The cause of ratios' weakness lay in the BMW 
guideposts themselves and in the Court's rationale of fair notice. 
Part V describes State Farm and its relationship to BMW. State 
Farm changed the Court's rationale for reviewing punitive 
damages. This new rationale demanded a stronger ratio guidepost, 
but State Farm did not formally distance itself from those parts of 
BMIIY that had rendered the ratio guidepost impotent. This has 
created a significant inconsistency in the Court's punitive damages 
doctrine. Nevertheless, lower courts appear to be making their 
way towards a more coherent punitive damages doctrine. In this 
way, the practical effect of the rationale "sea change" has been 
better realized than the jurisprudential one. 
11. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, ZNC. V. GORE 
As noted, BMW announced that ratio was to play a role in 
determining excessiveness. The constraining nature of ratios led 
Heinonline - -  20 Touro L. Rev. 946 2004-2005 
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many to posit that punitive damage awards would behave 
consistently after that decision. But scholars soon discovered 
inconsistency beyond that which had occurred pre-BMW. Ratio, a 
guidepost that should have constrained punitive awards was not 
necessarily doing its job and the other guideposts were helpless to 
impose consistency on punitive awards. 
BMW 
In 1990, Dr. Ira Gore bought a new BMW from a 
dealership in Alabama. He soon discovered that the car had been 
repainted prior to his p~rchase .~  It had been BMW's policy to 
repair damaged-but-new cars and sell as "new" those cars whose 
repair costs were less than three percent of their total value." 
Gore's damaged car had fallen into this group, and, consequently, 
BMW had sold the car to him without disclosing that it had been 
repainted. ' I  
Dr. Gore brought suit and an Alabama jury returned a 
verdict in his favor for $4,000 representing the diminution in value 
due to the repainting." The jury also awarded Dr. Gore $4 million 
in punitive damages, in light of all the damage caused throughout 
the United States by BMW's non-disclosure policy; Gore had 
contended at trial that BMW had similarly defrauded 
approximately 1,000 customers throughout the United States.13 
'Id. at 563. 
'O Id. at 563-64. 
" Id. at 564. 
" Id. at 565. 
l 3  BMW, 5 17 U.S. at 564. 
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BMW appealed the award and the Alabama Supreme Court 
ordered a remittitur of $2 million because the jury improperly 
considered BMW's acts of sale and non-disclosure in jurisdictions 
outside of Alabama." 
The United .States Supreme Court held that even this 
reduced award was unconstitutionally excessive. I S  Justice Stevens' 
opinion identified the constitutional problem as the absence of 
notice to BMW of such a large punitive damage award,I6 while 
Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, specifically described the 
constitutional concern in terms of arbitrariness, that is, the absence 
of " 'reasonable constraints' within which [a jury's] 'discretion is 
exercised. 7 7 7 1 7  These two rationales are intertwined: any provision 
of notice as to how or to what extent punitive damages will be 
awarded, simply by so outlining the outer limits of punitive 
damage awards, will have some effect on curbing a jury's 
arbitrariness. 
However, "fair notice" and "non-arbitrariness" are 
fundamentally different. They are respectively judged in relation 
to two different groups of actors. The purview of fair notice is 
l4 Id. at 567. 
15 Id at 573-74. The Court agreed with the Alabama Supreme Court that the 
jury had improperly considered BMW's acts and omissions outside of Alabama. 
It held that "a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws 
with the intent of changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States." Id. at 
572. 
16 Id. at 574-75 ("Three guideposts, each of which indicates that BMW did not 
receive adequate notice of the magnitude of the sanction that Alabama might 
impose. . . lead us to the conclusion that [the award was excessive].") (emphasis 
added). 
17 Id. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20-21). 
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limited to a particular defendant - he or she is the one harmed by 
the absence of such notice and his or her awareness of the punitive 
possibilities is the dispositive issue. An inquiry into non- 
arbitrariness, on the other hand, is directed toward the decision- 
maker, i.e., the jury. It is the jury's actions - its process - that 
matter, not necessarily the effect that process may or may not have 
on any defendant. According to Justice Breyer's concurrence, the 
harm in arbitrariness is more globalized in the sense that capricious 
awards damage respect for the legal system and not merely the 
wallet of a particular defendant." 
The practical difference between the two rationales lies in 
the extra requirement non-arbitrariness places on decision-makers. 
For example, a legislature might announce a range of possible 
punishments, thereby placing a defendant on fair notice of his or 
her liability. However, a rule of non-arbitrariness further requires 
that the decision-maker reason its way within that range. Fair 
notice, then, is often a by-product of non-arbitrariness, as non- 
arbitrary awards are more predictable. But fair notice is not 
sufficient by itself to provide for non-arbitrariness. Moreover, the 
measures which may ensure fair notice, perhaps the establishment 
of a range of possible awards, are not necessarily able to insure 
non-arbitrariness. 
From the concept of fair notice flowed BMWs three 
"guideposts" to direct excessiveness analyses. First, courts were to 
IS BMW, 5 1 7 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20- 
21). 
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consider the reprehensibility of a defendant's c o n d ~ c t . ' ~  On this 
count, BMW suggested punitive damages ought to "reflect 'the 
enormity of [the] offense.' "'O The Court delineated a general 
continuum of reprehensibility, with non-violent, negligent acts at 
one end and violent, intentional acts at the other." Later courts 
were to consider whether the harm caused was physical or 
economic; whether the plaintiff was financially vulnerable; 
whether the tortiuous acts were isolated or recurring; and whether 
the tort was intentional or ac~idental.'~ Of particular interest, BMW 
pronounced reprehensibility as "[plerhaps the most important 
indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages a ~ a r d . " ' ~  
The second BMW guidepost was the ratio of the punitive 
award to the compensatory award.24 Specifically, the punitive 
award was to bear some reasonable relationship to the "harm likely 
to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that 
actually has oc~urred."'~ BMW quickly cautioned, however, that 
no "simple mathematical formula" could determine whether a 
punitive award was con~titutional.~~ 
Finally, under the third guidepost, courts reviewing for 
excessiveness were to consider the "civil or criminal penalties that 
l9 Id. at 575. 
'O Id. (internal citation omitted). 
2' Id. at 575-76. 
'' Id. at 576. 
23 B W ,  517 U.S. at 575. 
24 Id. at 580-8 1 .  
Id. at 581 (emphasis omitted). 
' 6  Id. at 582. 
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could be imposed for comparable misc~nduct."'~ Along this line, 
reviewing courts were to " 'accord 'substantial deference' to 
legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the 
conduct at issue. 9 ,328 
The Aflermath 
After BMW, scholars eagerly waited to see what effect the 
Court's first decision holding a punitive award to be 
unconstitutionally excessive would have on punitive awards in 
general. Professors Eisenberg and Wells conducted a study of 
punitive damage awards during the period between May 1995 and 
July 1997 (the BMW decision was handed down in May 1996).'9 
They hypothesized that "punitive awards should be lower than 
before BMW and that the ratio of punitive awards to compensatory 
awards should have de~reased."~' 
Surprisingly, Eisenberg and Wells found "no significant 
difference in the pattern of awards before and after BMW and no 
significant difference in the rate at which courts order a reduction 
in punitive damages  award^."^' As expected, they found 
"meaningful differences in the ratio of punitive to compensatory 
awards."32 However, those differences occurred with respect to 
27 Id. at 583. 
28 B W ,  517 U.S. at 583 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco 
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 30 1 ( 1  989) (O'Connor, J.,  concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
*'See Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 7, at 63. 
30 Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 7, at 6 1 .  
3' Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 7, at 6 1 .  
32 Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 7, at 61. 
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low-ratio awards; post-BMW, high-ratio awards actually 
increased.') The punitive awards were shifting toward their 
respective ends of the ratio distribution - low ratios were getting 
lower and high ratios were getting higher. What could account for 
this polarization? Writing only one year after BMW,j4 Eisenberg 
and Wells later reasonably posited: "[Ilt may be that not enough 
time has elapsed for BMW to exercise significant influence on the 
pattern of punitive  award^."^' As time has passed and courts 
continued to accord little power to ratios, that explanation has 
become less and less plausible. 
If ratios played little or no constraining role in courts' 
decisions, it would not be surprising that Eisenberg and Wells 
found high ratios remaining high and ratios becoming polarized. 
Their hypothesized consistency of ratios depended upon ratios 
directing and constraining, to some extent, a court's ultimate 
decision. Left to their own devices, the first and third BMW 
guideposts were likely to cause exactly the phenomena that 
Eisenberg and Wells observed.36 
33 Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 7, at 61. 
34 Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Punitive Awards A jer  BMW, a New 
Capping System, and the Reported Opinion Bias, 1998 W s .  L. REV. 387 (1998). 
In this earlier post-BMW study, Eisenberg and Wells noted that the "universe of 
reported opinions . . . is systematically biased upwards." Id. at 409. 
35 Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 7, at 61. 
36 See Martin H .  Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages are 
Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1, 12 (2004) ("Because of the inherent 
vagueness of the criteria used to measure the constitutional validity of punitive 
damages awards, lower courts employing those criteria have permitted punitive 
damages awards that by most rational standards would likely be deemed 
. dramatically excessive.") (footnotes omitted). Professor Redish and Mr. 
Mathews find BMWs second guidepost to be inherently vague as well. They 
note that State Farm's single-digit ratio was adopted as a "guiding rule of 
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If reprehensibility were the criterion on which 
excessiveness was determined, high ratios would likely remain 
high." Juries give awards with high ratios in the first place when 
acts are particularly offensive; they give awards with low ratios 
when the acts are less so. When ratios are not taken into account, 
therefore, reprehensibility can ,protect the award and the 
corresponding punitive-to-compensatory ratio from judicial 
scrutiny driven by otherwise constraining con~iderations.~~ 
Moreover, examination of comparable sanctions is hardly 
an effective control. Most importantly, the third guidepost offers 
little help in constraining punitive awards in cases where jail time 
might be available because of the incommensurability of economic 
sanctions and impris~nment.~~ So, for what are likely the most 
thumb" to combat the dramatically excessive punitive awards that had been 
allowed under BMW. Id. Their complaint with the single-digit rule of thumb is 
that such an arbitrary mathematical formula "underscores the quasi-legislative 
nature of the Court's constitutional doctrine." Id. 
37 See, e.g., Steven L Chanenson & John Y. Gotanda, The Foggy Road for 
Evaluating Punitive Damages: Lijiing the Haze from the BMWState Farm 
Guideposts, 37 U .  MICH. J.L. REFORM 441, 443 (2004) ("The first guidepost, 
concerning reprehensibility, remains amorphous. Because the Court did not 
provide a clear set of criteria to determine whether a defendant's conduct 
justifies a certain amount of punitive damages, applying this guidepost is highly 
subjective and can lead to inconsistent decisions."); Stephanie L. Nagel, B W  v. 
Gore: The United States Supreme Court Overturns an Award of Punitive 
Damages as Violative of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, 7 1 TUL. L. 
REV. 1025, 1039 (1997) ("[Tlhe only predictable cases are those that land at the 
extremes of the reprehensibility scale."). 
38 But see Chanenson and Gotanda, supra note 37, at 470 (noting that reliance 
on ratios might also lead to inconsistent results because of the ease with which 
ratios can be manipulated, particularly with respect to potential harm). 
39 Chanenson and Gotanda, supra note 37, at 479-80 ("Comparing punitive 
damages awards to non-monetary criminal punishments . . . would effectively 
eviscerate the third guidepost because such punishments are not meaningfully 
comparable to monetary fines. . . . Any nontrivial potential term of 
imprisonment would likely justify almost any size punitive damages awards."). 
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egregious cases, the third guidepost does no work in constraining 
punitive damage awards.'' Furthermore, courts rarely apply the 
third g~idepost .~ '  Finally, the Court itself has expressed concern 
over the propriety of applying the third guidepost. In Stare Farm, 
Justice Kennedy observed the disconnect between the standards of 
proof required in civil versus criminal cases and noted "[plunitive 
damages are not a substitute for the criminal process, and the 
remote possibility of a criminal sanction does not automatically 
sustain a punitive damages a~a rd . ' ' ~ '  
In short, one should have expected that post-BMW ratios 
would behave according to Eisenberg and Wells' expectations, i.e. 
consistently, only if post-BMW courts were actually considering an 
award's ratio or some other similarly constraining factor in their 
analyses. But, as is discussed in the next section, lower courts 
were not using the ratio guidepost in that way. 
111. THE SECOND ~ U I D E P O S T  BETWEEN B M w  AND 
STATE FARM 
In fact, courts were often not using the ratio guidepost in 
any meaningful way at all. Coupled with the weakly constraining 
40 But see Chanenson and Gotanda, supra note 37, at 480-81 (contending that 
the third guidepost should only look to criminal fines, rather than all criminal 
punishments). 
4 1  See, e.g., David Hogg, Alabama Adopts De Novo Review for Punitive 
Damages Appeals: Another Landmark Decision or Much Ado About Nothing?, 
54 ALA. L.  REV. 223,232 (2002) (suggesting that resort to comparable sanctions 
would provide clarity with respect to excessiveness analyses). 
42 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 583 U.S. 408,428 (2003). 
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first and third guidepost (which, as discussed, was not being used 
very much either), the BMW framework was bound to produce 
arbitrary punitive awards. A search of August 1997-April 2003 
cases found over 300 decisions in which courts reviewed punitive 
damage awards within the BMW framework.43 In these cases, 
courts rather consistently found the ratio guidepost to be weak, i.e., 
they accorded the ratio guidepost little or no weight at all. More 
often than not, this discarding of ratios was based upon either the 
subordinate role ratios were required to play in excessiveness 
analyses or the futility that many courts believed necessarily 
characterized any analysis driven by such a mathematical tool. 
At the outset, it is important to lay out what it means for a 
guidepost to be "weak" or "strong." In the extreme case, it is 
possible that a court might find one guidepost to be decisive. The 
court might determine that because of considerations of 
reprehensibility, ratio or comparable sanctions alone, a decision 
necessarily follows regarding the constitutionality of a punitive 
damage award. For instance, the first guidepost might be strong if, 
despite an apparently unreasonable ratio and no comparable 
sanctions, an award was upheld on the grounds that the act was so 
despicable as to merit extraordinary punishment. 
A lesser version of one guidepost's strength would be the 
following example: Imagine a court basing its ruling on a 
43 These cases ranged from state appellate courts to federal district and appellate 
courts. At least one study found "no substantial evidence of significant 
differences in the treatment of the punitive-compensatory ratio by state and 
federal courts or by [federal] district courts, and [federal] courts of appeals." 
Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 34, at 4 10. 
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guidepost when it is not clear in which direction the others point. 
In the case of a moderately reprehensible act and a ratio that is on 
the border of reasonableness, the third guidepost might be strong 
if, on the ground that no similar sanctions existed in criminal or 
civil law, the court struck down an award as being 
unconstitutionally excessive.j4 
On the other hand, it would seem as though a guidepost 
was weak if a court recognized that it cut in favor of or against an 
award, but ruled in the opposite fashion. For example, imagine a 
court recognizing that a ratio was exceptionally high, but ruling the 
award constitutional because the defendant's reprehensibility was 
great and there existed comparable sanctions. It would be sensible 
to say that the second guidepost was weaker than the sum of the 
other two. Of course, the last example should strike most people 
as not necessarily valuing one guidepost less than any other. 
Instead, it may be that the sum of the other guideposts simply 
trumped the single. 
Along this line, it might be the case that one guidepost 
trumps two others, leading to the conclusion that the two are 
relatively weak. But such a conclusion may be based on one 
guidepost so strongly pointing in one direction as to overcome the 
marginal guidance provided by the other two. Of course, this does 
not mean that the court has failed to ascribe equal importance to 
the other two guideposts. Instead, it merely indicates that the 
- -- - -- 
44 This is similar to the proposal of Chanenson and Gotanda. See supra note 37 
and accompanying text. 
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guidance provided by the two guideposts, taken together, is not as 
strong as the single one in that particular case. 
With this in mind, it is safe to say that the majority of post- 
BMW cases exemplified a trend among many courts to accord little 
or no weight to ratio. And, as mentioned, this lack of gravity was 
occasioned by two considerations. 
In many cases, ratio explicitly played a subordinate role. 
4 5 For example, in Rahn v. Junction City Foundry, Inc., a federal 
district court in Kansas upheld a $30,000 punitive damage award.46 
It mentioned all three of the BMW guideposts, beginning with the 
first and the third.47 Affer concluding that the defendant's acts 
were reprehensible and that comparable sanctions existed, the 
court ruled: "[dlefendant had fair notice that it could be exposed to 
punitive damages in the circurnstance~."~~ Conspicuously, it did 
not find'that the defendant was also on notice as to the possible 
punitive to compensatory ratio. Instead, the court held, without 
further discussion and in a separate passage, that the ratio "[was] 
not unconstitutionally disprop~rtionate."~~ 
Rahn could not have been "disproportionate" because the 
defendant was aware that ratios might be that high." AS noted, the 
Rahn court never indicated that there were other cases that put the 
defendant on notice of a 30 to 1 ratio or that 30 to 1 was otherwise 
45 161 F. Supp. 2d 12 19 (D. Kan. 2001). 
46 Id. at 1243. 
47 Id. at 1244. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 1245. 
'O Rahn, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1244. 
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within the range of punitive damage liability likely to be expected 
by a defendant. Instead, the ratio was deemed "not 
unconstitutionally disproportionate" because the case was not one 
of "purely economic injury."" The determination on the point of 
reprehensibility (and perhaps comparable sanctions), that the injury 
went beyond the "economic," simply eviscerated the need to even 
examine the ratio. 
Furthermore, in Seitzinger v. Trans-Lux Corp., the New 
Mexico Supreme Court upheld a $400,000 punitive award (26 to 1 
ratio) in a sexual harassment case.52 First, the court held that the 
defendant's actions were reprehensible enough to warrant a 
significant punitive damage award.53 It went on to simultaneously 
address the second and third BMW guideposts: 
Here the ratio is twenty-six to one. We generally 
agree the ratio is high. But, is it too high? 
[Defendant] notes that no New Mexico employment 
termination case has upheld a punitive damage ratio 
of this magnitude. [Defendant] also reminds us . . . 
that, "if the damages are significant and the injury 
not hard to detect, the ratio of punitive damages to 
the harm generally should not exceed ten to one." 
[Defendantl's observations are accurate as far as 
they go, but they do not resolve the issue.54 
The court continued by observing that the public policy 
against sexual harassment was so strong it could not "say as a 
" Id. at 1245. 
'' No. 20678, 2001 WL 1748893, at *12 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2001) 
(unpub'd). 
53 Id. at $11-12. 
54 Id. at $12. 
Heinonline - -  20 Touro L. Rev. 958 2004-2005 
20051 PUNITIVE DAMAGES 959 
matter of law that the ratio is too high.''" Although the ratio was 
"high" and no comparable sanctions existed in case law, the court 
still refused to deem the award excessive.j6 
Such instances of reprehensibility defeating ratio were 
5 7 common. In State Compensation Insurance Fund v. WPS, Inc., a 
California court determined that the defendant's "willful[] 
perpetrat[ion of] a fraud on a company serving the public need of 
providing workers' compensation insurance" was reprehensible.'' 
As for the second guidepost, the court ruled that "the ratio of 14 to 
1 . . . is not excessive given the ongoing fraudulent conduct 
engaged in by W P S . " ~ ~  In Wightman v. Consolidated Rail 
 or^.,^' the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a $15 million punitive 
damage award, an award 6,250 times greater than the 
compensatory award.61 The dispaiity was not inappropriate, 
according to the court, "because a punitive damages award is more 
about a defendant's behavior than the plaintiffs 1 0 ~ s . " ~ ~  
Moreover, the actual damages had "little to do with how a jury 
55 Id. 
56 Id. See Axen v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 974 P.2d 224, 243 (Or. Ct. App. 
1999) (stating that the state had a strong interest in preventing catastrophe, 
though the risk of such an event was low). 
57 B116419, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2458, at $1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 
2001) (unpub'd). 
58 Id. at $50. 
59 Id. Briefly discussing the third guidepost, the court found that WPS was on 
notice of the possibility of the punitive damage award because "fraud has been a 
predicate for imposing punitive damages since . . . 1872!" Id. The court ignored 
the idea, enunciated in B M ,  that it is notice concerning the amount of punitive 
damages that drives the constitutional analysis. 
60 715 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio 1999). 
61 Id. at 55 1-52. 
62 Id. at 553. 
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might effectively and fairly punish and deter Conrail's cond~ct ."~ '  
In both cases, ratios could hardly have been more meaningless. 
Indeed. Wightman came close to saying just that when it candidly 
announced: "We see the ratio between the compensatory and 
punitive damages as less relevant here because of the 
egregiousness of the act."63 
The elevation of reprehensibility to a position above ratio 
was not the only problem for the ratio guidepost. The 
impossibility of mathematical certainty with respect to what was a 
permissible or impermissible ratio also drove courts to simply 
disregard ratios entirely. In Daka, Inc. v. Breiner.,65 the District of 
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a $390,000 punitive 
award, an award 39 times the compensatory award. The court 
admitted that such a ratio might give cause for suspicion. The 
court reasoned "the Supreme Court in TXO upheld an award of 
$19,000 in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive 
damages, a ratio of more than five hundred to one. . . . In [BMW], 
on the other hand, the Court reversed . . . a ratio of five hundred to 
one."66 When read together, Daka said, these cases reaffirmed that 
no mathematical bright line exists that fits every case.67 That is the 
last reference to ratio made in the opinion. The futility of finding a 
bright line apparently meant that ratio contributes nothing to the 
excessiveness analysis. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 554. 
65 71 1 A.2d 86 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
66 Id. at 101. 
67 Id. 
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The Sixth Circuit offered a prime example of this futility- 
driven position. In Jeffries v. Wal-Mart,68 the court upheld a 50 to 
1 ratio between compensatory and punitive awards. The court did 
not discuss the first or third guideposts, but did explain its 
interpretation of the second guidepost. The court cited BMW for 
the proposition that a high ratio, even 500 to 1 will not, by itself, 
offend constitutional due process.69 What force a 50 to 1 or 500 to 
1 ratio might have upon the analysis was left unclear, as the court 
succinctly announced "Wal-Mart's argument has failed to 
convince 
Judge Bell, in his dissent, addressed each of the guideposts. 
He wrote that the defendant's actions were not so reprehensible as 
to warrant a $425,000 punitive a ~ a r d . ~ '  After comparing the 
punitive award to the "actual [I damages suffered by the plaintiff 
plus the harm likely to result from defendant's action," Bell found 
nothing to indicate a reasonable relati~nship.~' In addition, there 
were no criminal sanctions for the defendant's conduct and 
punitive damage awards for retaliatory discharge actions were 
capped at the lev& of $300,000 by C~ngress .~ '  
Jefferies, then, is an example of the ratio guidepost's 
weakness to the extent that ratio was unable to have any effect on 
15 Fed. Appx. 252 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpub'd). 
69 Id. at 266. 
70 Id. 
7 1 Id. at 267 (Bell, J., dissenting). 
72 Id. at 270. 
73 Jej'iries, 15 Fed Appx. at 270 (Bell, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. S 
198a(b)). 
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\+-hat was apparently a blank slate. Gii~en a relatively high ratio, 
the majority did not feel compelled to strike the award down. 
However, the court did not refute the claim that the ratio was high. 
stating only that a high ratio by itself would not offend due 
process, and when the "ratio is a breathtaking 500 to 1 . . . the 
- ,:74 award must surely 'raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.' This 
implied that one or both of the other guideposts counseled 
upholding the award. But, as described in Bell's dissent, Jefferies 
would appear to be a case where the first and third guideposts 
were: in the majority's mind, neutral. And in the absence of 
direction from the other guideposts, the court could not conclude 
that a 50 to 1 ratio was dispositive. Absent such direction, one is 
left to wonder what import a ratio could possibly have. 
Courts also fail to take the second guidepost seriously even 
when overturning punitive damage awards or ordering remittitur. 
In Fall v. Indiana University Board of  trustee^,^^ the court noted 
the futility of using ratio more bluntly when remitting a punitive 
award that was 155 times the amount of the compensatory award. 
The court noted: "The rather fact-specific nature of the ratio 
guidepost appears to limit this factor's importance in reviewing the 
excessiveness of a damage a ~ a r d . " ' ~  The ratio guidepost had been 
rendered utterly impotent by the fact that no bright line existed. 
74 Id. at 266 (quoting BMW, 5 17 U.S. at 583) (internal citations omitted). 
75 33 F. Supp. 2d 729 (N.D. Ind. 1998). 
76 Id. at 746. See Progressive Motors v. Frazier, 220 B.R. 476 (Bankr. D. Utah 
1998). BMWs rejection of a categorical approach led to the conclusion that 
"there is no set rule on the amount of punitive damages that may be imposed." 
Id. at 479. 
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Not only were extreme ratios unimportant to courts, but an 
apparently reasonable ratio did little to save punitive damage 
awards. In 2660 Woodley Road Joint Venture v. ITT S h e r ~ t o n , ~ ~  a 
federal trial court in Delaware reduced a punitive damage award of 
$37.5 million notwithstanding the fact that it was only three times 
the compensatory award. The court found that the defendants' 
actions were not so reprehensible as to warrant the large punitive 
damage award.78 On the other hand, with respect to the third 
guidepost, the court found that the defendants had "notice that their 
questionable conduct could result in the imposition of a substantial 
financial penalty."79 Finally, the cburt addressed the 3 to 1 ratio: 
"the proper inquiry for considering the reasonableness of the ratio 
between compensatory and punitive damages is 'whether there is a 
reasonable relationship between the punitive damages and the 
harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the 
. . 
harm that actually occurred. Y ,780 In deciding whether the ratio was 
reasonable, the court shifted its focus to the fact that deterrence 
was unnecessary in the defendant's case." The result in 2660 
Woodley Road - that a 3 to 1 ratio was unreasonable - seems, at 
77 NO. 97-450-JJF, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 439, at *1 (D. Del. January 10, 
2002). 
78 Id. at *20. 
79 Id. at *26. The court based this finding on the fact that defendants realized a 
profit of over $68 million from the contract upon which the fraud action was 
based. Id. 
Id. at *22-23 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 581). 
8 1 Id. at *23-24 ("Further, in the Court's view, a reduced punitive damages 
award would still serve a deterrent function while comporting more with the 
boundaries of punishment warranted by the conduct in this case."). 
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the very least, a strange result given that other ratios far in excess 
of treble damages have been upheld." 
In all of these cases of weak ratios it is difficult to imagine 
courts ruling differently had the ratios been more extreme, or, in 
the cases like 2660 Woodley Road, less so. The reasonableness of 
the ratio was of little or no importance to the ultimate resolution of 
the excessiveness inquiry. Whether it was because other 
considerations were more important or because there was simply 
no workable way of applying the ratio guidepost. a third of BlWVs 
analysis was often being disregarded." 
'' See also Gray v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 948, 959 (W.D. Mo. 
1999) (stating that an award which corresponded to a 5 to I ratio was excessive, 
while one that resulted in a 2 to 1 ratio was not). 
83 There was a minority of cases in which the ratio guidepost was strong. See, 
e.g., Rubinstein v. Adm'rs Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 408 (5th Cir. 
2000) ("Having found that the award fails to satisfy the second requirement, we 
need not examine the third prong of the BMW test."); Murray v. Solidarity Labor 
Org. Int'l Union Benefit Fund, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1153 (N.D. Iowa 2001); 
Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Brown, 832 So. 2d I, 24 (Ala. 2001) ("In light of the fact 
that Brown's total compensatory damages amount to no more than $60,000, we 
conclude that her punitive damages should amount to no more than $1 80,000."); 
Kent v. White, 559 S.E.2d 731, 739 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002), stating: 
When the ratio of 13.58 to 1 of [defendantl's actual damages 
to punitive damages is compared to the punitive damages 
average ratios for other individuals, such ratio is much lower 
at 4.67 to 1. But when [defendantl's ratio is compared to the 
corporate average of 12.6, [it] even exceeds the corporate 
average. Thus, the punitive damages returned against 
[defendant] under a Gore analysis are grossly excessive 
punishment. . . . 
Notrica v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) 
(ordering a new trial on punitive damages unless the plaintiff agreed to a 
reduction of the award, so that the punitive-to-compensatory ratio would be 
approximately 10 to 1 ; and therefore, within a presumptively constitutional 
range). 
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IV. THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM - THE ROAD TO 
NOWHERE 
These cases, some decided well after the Eisenberg and 
Wells' study, point to a more systematic cause of the phenomenon 
they had discovered. The cause of the ratio guidepost's weakness 
lay in RMW itself. Along this line, Justice Scalia wrote a stinging 
dissent in BMW.84 In it, he challenged a number of the majority's 
conclusions. Most importantly for the issue at hand, he suggested 
that the guideposts "mark a road to nowhere; they provide no real 
guidance at all."85 In particular, Justice Scalia complained that 
"[tlhe Court has constructed a framework that does not genuinely 
constrain, that does not inform . . . lower While perhaps 
a road to nowhere, the guideposts were unable to constrain 
punitive damage awards because they were not designed to 
constrain. In this way, BMW was not wrongly decided, nor was 
the framework it created not up to the challenge. In fact, the 
framework was up to the challenge - the absence of fair notice to 
defendants - but that challenge simply did not require much 
constraint. 
It should have been no surprise that the ratio guidepost 
failed to "genuinely constrain" awards, as BMW had specifically 
instructed courts to place significant weight on reprehensibility as 
the "most important" g~idepost.~' This sapped the ratio guidepost 
84 BMW, 5 17 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
85 Id. at 605. 
86 Id. at 606. 
'' Id. at 575. 
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of its ability to guide anything at all - courts simply "turned off 
the road" after passing reprehensibility. Moreover, a reasonable 
reading of BMW7s confusing rejection of bright-line tests led lower 
courts to undervalue the ratio guidepost in other cases. That is, 
even if courts got past reprehensibility to consider ratio, the latter 
was often deemed a non-starter for determining excessiveness. 
Thus, any constraining power that ratios may have had was 
undercut by these two caveats. 
These two provisos, though, were not inconsistent with 
BMW insofar as the majority was primarily concerned with fair 
notice. Reliance on reprehensibility arguably achieved fair notice 
and no bright mathematical lines were needed to let defendants 
know that they could be on a rather large punitive hook for 
egregious acts. Thus, the resulting impotence of the ratio 
guidepost detailed above was not inconsistent with the rationale 
underlying BMW. 
The Primacy of Reprehensibility 
When BMW announced the three guideposts, each appeared 
to be an equal partner in determining excessiveness: 
Three guideposts, each of which indicates that 
BMW did not receive adequate notice of the 
magnitude of the sanction that Alabama might 
impose . . . lead us to the conclusion that the $2 
million award against BMW is grossly excessive: 
the degree of reprehensibility of the nondisclosure; 
the disparity between the harm or potential harm 
suffered . . . and [the] punitive damage award; and 
the difference between this remedy and the civil 
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penalties authorized or imposed in comparable 
The opinion continued by noting that ratio was "perhaps [the] most 
commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive 
damages award," and had "a long ~edigree."'~ The majority noted: 
"Our decisions . . . endorsed the proposition that a comparison 
between the compensatory award and the punitive award is 
s ignif i~ant ."~~ BMW went so far as to note, referring to PacrJic 
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, that a 4 to 1 ratio was "close to" but 
did not " 'cross the line into constitutional impropriety. 7 ,791 
However, the majority also confusingly elevated 
reprehensibility above the other guideposts by naming it the "most 
important indicium of Lower courts needed to 
account for this instruction as to reprehensibility's primacy. The 
Court did not give any indication, however, as to how much more 
important, vis-6-vis the other two guideposts, this "most important" 
one was to be. Because the Court's only statement on the issue 
was that reprehensibility was generally more important than the 
other two, any decision based on the extremity of a high ratio or 
the absence of comparable sanctions risked remand that such court 
had not heeded B W s  instruction. This is not to say that BMW 
explicitly forced ratios or comparable sanctions to be disregarded. 
88 Id. at 574-75. 
89 BMW, 517 U.S. at 580. 
90 Id. at 581. 
9 1 Id. (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24). 
92 Id. at 575. 
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Certainly, later courts were not clearly or obviously bound to allow 
reprehensibility to run roughshod over those guideposts. 
Kevertheless, given the lack of direction from the Court, it was not 
surprising that they often did. 
Therefore, BMW was arguably being followed rather than 
distorted in each case described in Part I11 where reprehensibility 
overwhelmed ratio. Of course, the notion of reprehensibility's 
importance had been developed by the Court over time and was 
not created by BMW.93 But because BMW purported to establish a 
tripartite framework, the primacy of reprehensibility turned out to 
be, at the very least, problematic with respect to the application of 
all three guideposts. 
Moreover, there is reason to be concerned that 
reprehensibility, standing apart from the other guideposts, does not 
do much to constrain punitive awards. In his BMW concurrence, 
Justice Breyer cautioned against the possibility of courts "mak[ing] 
'reprehensibility' a concept without constraining force, i.e., to 
deprive the concept of its constraining power to protect against 
serious and capricious  deprivation^."^' First, a jury's determination 
of a defendant's reprehensibility is notoriously difficult for an 
appellate court to review.95 Moreover, the punitive damage analog 
93 Id. at 575-76 (citing cases). 
94 BMW, 517 U.S. at 590 (Breyer, J., concurring). A defendant's wealth 
"cannot make up for the failure of other factors, such as 'reprehensibility,' to 
constrain significantly an award that purports to punish a defendant's conduct." 
Id. at 59 1. 
95 See Chanenson & Gotanda, supra note 37, at 467 n.165 and accompanying 
text. 
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of any particular level of reprehensibility is extremely murky.96 
That is, even if a court can effectively review whether an act is 
slightly or outrageously reprehensible, that determination's import 
for computing punitive damage awards is unclear. Is there no limit 
on the punitive damages available in the case of the outrageously 
reprehensible act? Even when BMW established something of a 
sliding scale of reprehensibility, it did not address this issue of 
commensurability. 
Ratios as Futile 
Even had BMW said nothing about the relative importance 
of reprehensibility or ratio, it still qualified prospective application 
of the ratio guidepost so as to render it impotent. After describing 
the importance of ratios, the opinion immediately stated: "Of 
course, we have consistently rejected the notion that the 
constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, 
even one that compares actual and potential damages to the 
punitive award."" The Court then specified that: 
[Llow awards of compensatory damages may 
properly support a higher ratio than high 
compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly 
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of 
economic damages. . . . Higher ratios may also be 
justified in cases in which the . . . non-economic 
harm might have been difficult to dete~mine.'~ 
96 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 
2 1 7 (2002). 
'' B W ,  5 17 U.S. at 582 (citations omitted). 
98 Id. 
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The conclusion to the Court's ratio discussion quoted Huslip's 
directive that " .[w]e need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a 
mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable 
and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case. ' '399 
The first reason for rejecting a bright-line mathematical test 
seems clear. The guidepost framework does not contemplate a 
ratio as dispositive between the "constitutionally acceptable" and 
the "constitutionally unacceptable." This kind of inter-guidepost 
dominance would obviate the need for reprehensibility and 
comparable sanctions. Not only does such a dominant guidepost 
. . 
appear inappropriate in light of the BlMW framework, but to the 
extent one .guidepost was intended to become dominant, it was 
reprehensibility and not ratio. 
The turn away from ratio's dominance should hardly have 
necessitated its irrelevance, though. Requiring an award's ratio to 
be only one of three factors in determining the ultimate question of 
unconstitutional excessiveness does not require a court to abstain 
from passing judgment on a ratio's reasonableness. In this way, a 
100 to 1 ratio might be unreasonable, but, at the same time, the 
other guideposts may strongly point toward an award's 
constitutionality. 
Accordingly, a court should not treat the unreasonable ratio 
as being dispositive of the constitutional issue. Along this line, it 
makes sense to restrain ratio's power in those instances where its 
probity is minimal, as in the cases where non-economic harm was 
99 Id. at 582-83 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18). 
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significant or where actual damages were low."' For instance, it 
makes little sense to allow a corporation to avoid high punitive 
damages by simply practicing discrimination against poorly paid 
employees so as to cause only minor actual damages. The problem 
with bright lines is not with mathematical exactitude in respect to 
the isolated ratio guidepost, but rather, mathematical exactitude in 
respect to the full excessiveness inquiry. 
Yet, as discussed in Part 111, some courts interpreted 
B W s  rejection of bright lines as a statement of doubt concerning 
the utility of ratios generally. Fall v. Indiana University Board of 
Trustees made this point most clearly when it stated the "fact- 
specific nature of the ratio guidepost appears to limit this factor's 
importance in reviewing the excessiveness of a damage award.""' 
This interpretation had merit. As noted, BMW was concerned with 
the ability of ratio to dominate the other guideposts: "low awards 
of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio than 
high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly 
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic 
darn age^.^"^' Ratio does not necessarily control when 
reprehensibility points in the other direction - a point consistent 
with the discussion up to now. Nothing about that line from the 
Court's opinion should have rendered ratios meaningless. 
100 Some courts have read these caveats to a very broad degree. In Romano v. 
U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655, 673 (1st Cir. 2000), the First Circuit upheld a 19 to 
1 ratio because actual damages were "low7'; actual damages in that case were 
$15,000. 
lo' 33 F. Supp. 2d 729,746 (N.D. Ind. 1998). 
'O2BMW, 517 U.S. at 582. 
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However. BIMW then noted: "A higher ratio may also be 
justified in cases in which the . . . non-economic harm might have 
been difficult to determine,"lo3 rather than explicitly limiting ratio's 
power to overwhelm considerations of reprehensibility. This may 
be interpreted as an attack on the utility of ratios themselves. 
Irrespective of how reprehensible an act was or whether there were 
comparable sanctions available, this line from the opinion raised 
questions as to whether a court could ever be confident that a ratio 
between punitive and compensatory damages is good evidence as 
to excessivenessy rather than a concern about the interplay between 
ratio and the other guideposts. This concern strikes at the ratio 
guidepost independently - how confident can a court be that the 
compensatory damages it is using are the appropriate comparison? 
This variability of what constitutes a "reasonable ratio" is 
the best argument for the futility to which cases like Fall referred. 
Such an argument does not mistake the restriction on the role ratios 
were to play in determining excessiveness with doubt about the 
possibility of determining whether a ratio is unreasonable in the 
first place. However, even this more reasonable interpretation is 
problematic. BMW only offered one example of when a ratio's 
reasonableness might vary - the case of hard-to-evaluate non- 
economic damages.lo4 While certainly a broad caveat in a world 
where non-economic damages are frequently claimed by plaintiffs, 
the doubt about the reasonableness of ratios in such cases should 
Io3 Id. 
Io4 Id. 
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only go so far as the non-economic damages are difficult to 
measure. What is less clear is whether there are other cases in 
which a higher ratio may be justified. Nevertheless, and as the 
relative complexity of the preceding discussion shows, it should 
not have been surprising that some lower courts essentially read 
the second guidepost out of BMW based on the impossibility of 
evaluating the reasonableness of a ratio. 
Arbitrariness versus Fair Notice 
One could conclude that BMW and the impotent ratio 
guidepost it created might have succeeded at achieving its stated 
goal of placing defendants on fair notice of punitive liability; at the 
very least, the marginalization of ratios did not necessarily 
undermine fair notice. If the primacy of reprehensibility and the 
rejection of mathematical bright lines found in BMW directly led to 
the marginalization of ratio in later cases, these concepts 
themselves reflected the limited nature of B W s  due process 
concern. As noted, the rationale behind BMUl' turned on the need 
for fair notice'05 - a goal relatively easy to achieve. To take the 
extreme case, the government's announcement that punitive 
damages are unlimited would arguably provide fair notice to 
defendants to avoid committing horrific torts. A criterion like 
105 See id. at 574. "Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our 
constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of 
the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the 
penalty that a State may impose." Id. "None of these statutes would provide an 
out-of-state distributor with fair notice that the first violation . . . of its 
provisions might subject an offender to a multimillion dollar penalty." Id. at 
584. 
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reprehensibility, one certainly not marginalized by B M T ,  provides 
a sufficient amount in the way of notice. Putative tortfeasors are 
placed on notice that their punitive damage liability will be 
measured against a jury's opinion of their acts' egregiousness. 
Moreover, it is fairly certain that fair notice does not require 
mathematical exactitude. In this way, those aspects in BMW that 
often caused ratios to drop out of the excessiveness equation were 
not necessarily contrary to the concept of fair notice 
If fair notice, as a rationale, can take or leave ratios as an 
indicium of excessiveness, non-arbitrariness does not have that 
luxury. For non-arbitrariness as a constitutional concern, one need 
look no further than Justice Breyer's concurrence in BMW, in 
which he observed that the actual concern giving rise to 
constitutional limitations on punitive damage award amounts was 
the caprice of the decision-maker. Describing the need for 
constitutional oversight, he said: 
The reason [for such review] flows from the Court's 
emphasis in Haslip upon the constitutional 
importance of legal standards that provide 
"reasonable constraints" within which "discretion is 
exercised," that assure "meaningful and adequate 
review by the trial court whenever a jury has fixed 
the punitive damages," and permit "appellate 
review [that] makes . certain that the punitive 
damages are reasonable in their amount and rational 
in light of their purpose . . . . ,,lo6 
-- - 
106 Id. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20-21). 
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According to Justice Breyer, the guideposts must ultimately 
be able to function as "standards" and "constraints" on a jury's 
decision-making.'07 He distinguished this basis from mere fair 
notice: "Requiring the application of law, rather than a 
decisionmaker's caprice, does more than simply provide citizens 
notice of what actions may subject them to punishment; it also 
helps to assure the uniform general treatment of similarly situated 
persons that is the essence of law itself"'08 
While "fair notice" might be satisfied through putative 
defendants imagining a prospective jury's view of their 
reprehensibility, reprehensibility alone does not provide the 
constraint necessary to "assure the uniform treatment of similarly 
situated persons" so crucial to Justice Breyer's mind.'Og The 
determination of reprehensibility is ultimately a subjective one, 
particularly insusceptible of principled judicial review."O As a 
result, reprehensibility could not remain the most important 
guidepost once the underlying rationale shifted to non- 
arbitrariness. 
On the other hand, a strong ratio guidepost is not 
necessarily required by non-arbitrariness. Principled decision- 
107 BMW, 517 U.S. at 588 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
'08 Id. at 587 (emphasis added). 
Io9 Id. According to Justice Breyer, for the Alabama Supreme Court to find that 
there existed a reasonable relationship between $56,000 in actual damages and 
$2 million in punitive damages - when the harm was economic and there 
existed no evidence of continuing conduct - "is to empty the 'reasonable 
relationship' test of meaningful content." Id. at 590. That conclusion would 
seem equally applicable in light of the cases discussed in Part 111. 
' l o  Id. at 580-8 1. 
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making may be occasioned by any number of criteria. 
Nevertheless, a bright mathematical line certainly constrains in the 
fashion described by Justice Breyer. In particular, a bright line 
goes further than most in assuring uniform general treatment of 
similarly situated people. 
The Court returned to punitive damages generally, and the 
fair noticelnon-arbitrariness distinction specifically, in Cooper 
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc."' There, the Court 
held that appellate review of excessive punitive damage awards 
was to be conducted de novo."' In explaining why that standard of 
review was appropriate, Justice Stevens, again writing the majority 
opinion, touched on a number of considerations, inciuding the 
relative institutional competencies of trial and appellate  court^."^ 
But more importantly, he expanded the rationale for constitutional 
limitations on punitive damage awards. Cooper Industries 
specifically cited to the passage in Justice Breyer's BMW 
concurrence distinguishing between " 'simply provid[ing] citizens 
notice of what actions may subject them to punishment [and] . . . 
assur[ing] the uniform treatment of similarly situated persons. 3 7,114 
After Cooper Industries, non-arbitrariness, not fair notice, 
was the driving force behind review of punitive damage awards. It 
was non-arbitrariness that had been missing from BMW, in which 
the majority's reliance on fair notice had allowed the ratio 
'" 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
' l 2  Id. at 43 1. 
Id. at 440. 
114 Id. at 436 (quoting BMW, 5 17 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
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guidepost to be undercut. Requiring non-arbitrariness by requiring 
"standards" and "constraints" necessarily weakened 
reprehensibility's position as the "most important indicium" 
because reprehensibility, more than either of the other guideposts, 
allowed room for subjectivity and jury arbitrariness. 
Ratio, on the other hand, was less susceptible to fall sway 
to a jury's ~apr ice ."~  Though nuanced and fact-specific, ratio 
allowed perhaps the most objective criterion among the three 
guideposts for determining excessiveness. While the 
determination of what is and what is not an appropriate ratio is 
obviously arbitrary at the policy-making level,"6 the ratio 
guidepost's ability to be mathematically well defined in application 
became an advantage when the Court's focus shifted from fair 
notice to non-arbitrariness. 
V. STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE Co. V. CAMPBELL 
After Cooper Industries, and considering the post-BMW 
tendency by lower courts to accord little weight to ratios, the 
ground was fertile for a substantial restatement of the Court's 
punitive damages doctrine. This restatement would be made in 
State Farm. The decision was grounded in the due process 
concern for non-arbitrariness and, because of that re-evaluation, 
But see Chanenson & Gotanda, supra note 37, at 443 (noting that ratios may 
be manipulated). 
'I6 See, e.g., Redish & Mathews, supra note 36, at 12. 
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should have substantially changed BMWs lessons about both the 
primacy of reprehensibility and the impossibility of mathematical 
bright lines. Instead, Stute Farm equivocated between parroting 
BMW's discussion of both provisos and an implicit restatement of 
them. Lower courts faced with this conflict since State Farm 
appear to be surprisingly capable of utilizing the ratio guidepost. 
The Decision 
In 1981, Curtis Campbell tried to pass six vans on a two- 
lane highway in Utah. "' In the process, he forced Todd Ospital, a 
driver in the opposite lane, to veer off the road in order to avoid a 
colli~ion."~ Ospital lost control of the vehicle and struck another 
vehicle operated by Robert S l ~ s h e r . " ~  Ospital was killed and 
Slusher was permanently disabled; Curtis Campbell and his wife 
Inez were uninjured."' Ospital's estate and Slusher sued 
Campbell. Campbell's insurance company, State Farm, contested 
liability, and declined to settle with both parties for $25,000 each, 
which was the policy's limit.I2' State Farm assured the Campbells 
that "their assets were safe, that they had no liability for the 
accident . . . and that they did not need to procure separate 
counsel.""' At the subsequent trial, the Campbells' liability was 
assessed at approximately $186,000; State Farm initially refused to 
117 State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 583 U.S. 408, 412 (2003). 
118 Id. - - ~ .  
' I 9  ~ d .  at 413. 
lZO Id. 
I 2 l  Id. 
'22 State Farm, 583 U.S. at 413 (citation omitted). 
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pay the $1 36,000 difference between the judgment and the policy's 
$50,000 ma~imurn."~ The Campbells retained their own counsel 
and appealed the verdict.'24 During the appeal, the Campbells, 
Ospital's estate and Slusher reached a settlement pursuant to which 
the plaintiffs would not pursue their claims against the Campbells 
personally and the Carnpbells would pursue a bad faith action 
against State Farm, from which the majority of the proceeds would 
go to Ospital's estate and S1~sher . l~~ The Utah Supreme Court 
denied the Campbells' appeal of the action,lz6 and State Farm paid 
the whole judgment, including the amount over the Campbells' 
policy limits.I2' 
The Carnpbells then brought suit against State Farm 
alleging bad faith, fraud and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.I2' State Farm contended its decision not to settle had been 
an "honest mistake," but the Campbells introduced evidence 
demonstrating the decision was part of a nationwide practice by 
State Farm to cap insurance payouts.'29 The jury awarded the 
Carnpbells $2.6 million as a compensatory award and $145 million 
as a punitive award.I3O The trial court reduced both to $1 million 




'26 Slusher v. Ospital, 777 P.2d 437,438 (Utah 1989). 
12' State Farm, 538 U.S. at 414. 
12' Id. 
'29 ~ d .  at 414-15. 
1301d. at415. 
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reinstated the $145 nlillion punitive a\vard.I3' 
The Supreme Coun re\.srsed that decision.!'' In the 
majority opinion: Justice Kennedy. citing Justice Bre!.eras B.\fIi- 
concurrence, held that a punitive award could violate due process 
if it imposed '-grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a 
tortfeasor.""' The constitutional concern at issue was -'the 
imprecise manner in which puniti\.e damages systems are 
administered.'"" a clear statement of the Court's turn from fair 
notice to nan-arbitrariness. The Court went on: 
We have admonished that "punitive damayes pose 
an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property. 
Jury instructions typically leave the jury with wide 
discretion in choosing amounts" . . . . "The Due 
Process Clause does not permit a State to classif). 
arbitrariness as a virtue. Indeed, the point of due 
process - of the law in general - is to allo~v 
citizens to order their behavior.'"" 
Although fair notice was on the minds of the Srcitc Fcrrn~ majority, 
it was only fair notice as a product of non-arbitrariness. 
However, the two second-level aspects of BrbfIT discussed 
earlier - the primacy of reprehensibility and the futility of 
establishing bright mathematical lines - posed difficulties for the 
newly clarified rationale. Regarding the primacy of 
- ~ ~p ~ - - -  
171 See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 65 P.3d 1131. 1352 (L'tah 
200 I ) .  
I" Sfcire Farnr. 538 U.S. at 418. 
':' id. at 4 16. 
""Icl.at417. . 
; a >  Id. at 4 17- 18 (quoting Honda Motor Co. \ . Oberg. 5 12 U.S. 4 15.432 ( I9'i-l) 
and Hosli,~,. 499 U.S. at 59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). 
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reprehensibility, State Farm made this point also when, quoting 
from Justice Breyer7s BMUI' concurrence, it stated: " '[a 
defendant's wealth] cannot make up for the failure of other factors, 
such as 'reprehensibility,' to constrain significantly an award that 
purports to punish a defendant's conduct.' In this regard, 
"reprehensibility" can be a troubling guidepost with respect to 
arbitrariness vel non because it often provides little or no guidance 
at all. As for "bright lines," such mathematical tests, whatever 
their demerits on other grounds may be, are among the most 
obvious ways to constrain arbitrariness. 
Despite its tension with non-arbitrariness, State Farm did 
not formally break with either second-level aspect. The opinion 
reiterated that reprehensibility was the " 'most important indicium' 
" of a punitive award' s reasonableness. 13' Similarly, the majority 
again declined to "impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive 
damages award cannot exceed."13' 
136 Id. at 428 (quoting BMW, 5 17 U.S. at 591 (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
137 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 575). The Court 
noted: "While we do not suggest there was error in awarding punitive damages 
based upon State Farm's conduct toward the Campbells, a more modest 
punishment for this reprehensible conduct could have satisfied the State's 
legitimate objectives, and the Utah courts should have gone no further." Id. at 
419-20. Particularly problematic was the jury's knowledge of and reliance on 
State Farm's out-of-state practices in assessing punitive damages. Id. at 420-21. 
Not only had some of that out-of-state conduct been lawful where it occurred, 
but, noting the possibility of multiple recoveries, State Farm also held due 
process did not permit punishment of a defendant based on hypothetical claims. 
Id. at 423. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 572. 
13' State Farm, 538 U.S .  at 425. 
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Yet State Farm left little doubt that at least one of these 
issues was to be significantly reshaped. Immediately afier 
rejecting a "bright-line ratio," the majority stated: 
Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now 
established demonstrate . . . that, in practice, few 
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between 
punitive and compensatory damages, to a 
significant degree, will satisfy due process. . . . The 
[BMW] Court . . . referenced a long legislative 
history, dating back over 700 years and going 
forward to today, providing for sanctions of double, 
treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish. 
While these ratios are not binding, they are 
instructive. They demonstrate what should be 
obvious: Single-digit multipliers are more likely to 
comport with due process, while still achieving the 
State's goals of deterrence and retribution, than 
awards with ratios in range of 500 to 1, or, in this 
case, of 145 to 1. 
Thus, State Farm not only established that a numerical test could 
be used in respect of a ratio's reasonableness vel non, it established 
a mathematical line for the entire excessiveness decision that 
courts would have to justify crossing. 
In doing so, State Farm appeared to significantly change 
the way in which lower courts were to deal with ratios. Not only 
did the opinion place the presumptive cap on ratios at 9 to 1, it 
went on to specifically describe cases in which deviation from the 
single-digit rule would be appropriate: those cases where " 'a 
particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small. amount of 
139 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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economic damages' " or where " 'the injury is hard to detect or the 
monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to 
determine. 3 ,¶I40 Noticeably, these were exactly the situations 
offered for variation by BMW. But coupled with the single-digit 
presumption established by State Farm, these situations had 
arguably become exceptions to the rule, rather than evidence that 
no rule could possibly exist. In fact, the 9 to 1 "bright line" 
provided such solid footing for defendants to contend that higher 
ratios violate due process that Justice Ginsburg's State Farm 
dissent challenged the "numerical controls" as "boldly out of 
order."'41 State Farm's take on the primacy of reprehensibility was 
cloudier. As noted, State Farm continued to recognize 
reprehensibility as " '[tlhe most important indicium of the 
reasonableness of a punitive damages award.' "I4' Indeed, the 
majority devoted a sizable portion of the opinion to discussion of 
why the evidence provided below did not show particularly 
reprehensible conduct,143 and why the evidence that did was 
beyond the scope of the Carnpbells' Undoubtedly, 
reprehensibility remained important to the analysis. 
140 Id. (quoting BMW, 5 17 U.S. at 582). 
141 Id. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
14' Id. at 419 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 582). 
143 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419-20. 
[W]e must acknowledge that State Farm's handling of the 
claims against the Campbells merits no praise. . . . While we 
do not suggest there was error in awarding punitive damages 
based upon State Farm's conduct toward the Campbells, a 
more modest punishment for this reprehensible conduct could 
have satisfied the State's legitimate objectives . . . . 
Id. at 422. 
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Yet, in an important way, State Farm subordinated 
reprehensibility to ratio. No matter how egregious the defendant's 
act, State Farm established a presumptive 9 to 1 limit with respect 
to a ratio's rea~onab1eness.l~~ Moreover, State Farm equated this 
presumptive cap on a ratio's reasonableness with a general cap on 
an award's excessiveness. In this way, the decision made ratio the 
initial consideration in any excessiveness analysis, one whose 
qualifications appear specific and enumerated. Reprehensibility 
, , 
could overcome the presumption " 'where a particularly egregious 
act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages. 7 ,9146 
But no matter how egregious the act, "[wlhen compensatory 
damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to 
compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due 
process guarantee. "I4' After State Farm, ratio seemed to be in the 
driver's seat, and, while it remained the "most important indicium" 
in name, reprehensibility's effect on excessiveness analysis 
appeared severely constrained. 
Post-State Farm Cases 
The question remaining after State Farm, though, was 
For a more fundamental reason, however, the Utah courts 
erred in relying upon [State Farm's similar out-of-state 
conduct] and other evidence: The courts awarded punitive 
damages to punish and deter conduct that bore no relation to 
the Campbells' harm. A defendant's dissimilar acts, 
independent from the acts upon which liability was premised, 
may not serve as the basis for punitive damages. 
145 Id. at 425. 
146 Id, (quoting BMW, 5 17 U.S. at 582). 
14' Id. 
Heinonline - -  20 Touro L. Rev. 984 2004-2005 
20051 PUNITIVE D A M  GES 985 
whether the Court's reluctance to formally and forcefully depart 
from the qualifications to the ratio guidepost might cause, or at 
least allow, lower courts to disregard the shift in rationale and 
continue to generally disregard the ratio guidepost. The short-term 
and mostly anecdotal answer is that lower courts have adapted 
surprisingly well to the muddled state of affairs left by State Farm. 
These courts are vigorously using the ratio guidepost to constrain 
punitive damage awards, in line with a concern for non- 
arbitrariness. 
Take, for ' example, McClain v. Metabolife International 
Inc. ,14' in which a number of plaintiffs were awarded compensatory 
awards and punitive awards arising from the defendant's sale of 
diet pills. One of the seven plaintiffs punitive award ratio 
exceeded 9 to The district court first noted it had "hoped that 
State Farm would provide help for ruling on [defendantl's claim 
that the punitive damages imposed in these cases are excessive. 
Now the court is not sure that the ,wait was worth it."'50 Still, 
McClain observed that "State Farm begins to provide real help" 
when discussing ratios and the presumptive 9 to 1 lirnit.l5' Based 
solely on that presumptive limit, McClain limited those awards 
whose ratios exceeded 9 to 1 to that ratio and left alone all other 
14' 259 F. Supp 2d 1225 (N.D. Ala. 2003). 
'49 Id. at 1231. McClain did not decide whether another plaintiffs ratio was 7.5 
to 1 or 75,000 to a nominal amount, instead holding, pursuant to State Farm, 
that even in the latter case, the punitive award would have been justified because 
of the miniscule nature of the compensatory award. Id. at 1235. 
150 Id. at 1228-29. 
151 Id. at 1230. See id. at 123 1 (describing State Farm S ratio analysis as "the 
most potent ingredient in the witch's brew"). 
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punitive awards whose ratios were below 9 to l . I S 2  
Ratio as a constraint on jury caprice was clearly on the 
mind of the district court in Eden Electrical, Ltd. v. Amana Co.. 
L.P., in which the ratio for a purely economic injury was 8.5 to 
1 .IS' The court began by observing, ''after [BMW] and State Fili-m, 
the [punitive damage] award probably cannot exceed a 10-to-1 
ra t i~ . ""~  It explained: 
Specifically, this Court reads State Farm to mean 
that even where all the reprehensible considerations 
are present, but where con~pensatory damages are 
significant, the punitive damages award cannot 
ordinarily exceed the 1040-1 ratio and still be 
constitutional. Thus, even where a plaintiff has 
suffered a physical harm as a result of a recidivist 
defendant's intentional and malicious disregard for 
the health and safety of others, and the defendant 
targeted his victim because the victim was 
financially vulnerable, still that plaintiffs punitive 
damages award could probably not constitutionally 
exceed the 10-to-1 ratio. When the Court compares 
the punitive damages award in the instant case (an 
economic harm case) to this hypothetical case, 
surely it must conclude that the Plaintiffs 8.5-to-1 
ratio award is constitutionally e x c e s s i ~ e . ' ~ ~  
Obviously, ratio is the most important indicium of excessiveness 
under Eden Electrical's analysis. No matter the reprehensibility, 
ratio controls so long as the compensatory award was substantial 
enough to make ratio meaningful in the first place. 
15* Id. at 1235. 
153 258 F. Supp. 2d 958,974 (N.D. Iowa 2003). 
'54 Id. at 973. 
15' Id. at 974. 
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Even courts that question the perspicacity of State Farm 
have recognized its instruction that ratios are supposed to play a 
greater role in excessiveness analyses than they had previously. In 
TVT Records v. Island Def J a m  Music the court was 
presented with a number of punitive damage awards, each of 
which had a ratio below 9 to 1 .I5' The opinion was careful to tread 
lightly on the ground tilled by State Farm, noting "the Supreme 
Court's instructions on [the ratio] point still appear somewhat 
imprecise" and that "these [ratio] guidelines are far from firm and 
crystal-clear, and may be read by adverse litigants to accommodate 
their diametric  proposition^."'^' The court continued, stating: 
It is not the task of this Court to reconcile the 
extremes that still formative Supreme Court 
guidance conceivably might accommodate . . . . It 
suffices to say that whatever vagueness and tensions 
State Farm seems to reflect, to this Court the 
ruling's higher frequencies are quite audible; the 
notes resonate loud and clear concerns signaling 
that, at least under the circumstances the case at 
hand presents, the damages awards that prevail 
should register at the lower end of the ~ c a 1 e . l ~ ~  
The court concluded that because the compensatory awards 
reflected "complete compensation," even the sub 9 to1 ratios were 
unreasonable. 
'" 279 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
15' Id. at 449. 
"' Id. at 449,450. 
'59 Id. at 450. 
I6O Id. at 450-5 1 (citing Stare Farm, 538 U.S. at 424). 
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These cases and others have heeded State Farm's guidance 
that punitive awards should not exceed nine times the amount of 
compensatory damages except in certain well-defined cases.16' The 
absence of a bright line mathematical rule that had caused earlier 
courts to simply disregard ratios has been placed back into the 
context that certain cases of nominal or meager compensatory 
damages will require larger ratios. Moreover, these cases show 
that the titular position reprehensibility still holds as the "most 
important indicium" has been practically disregarded as lower 
courts move more towards a ratio-based doctrine. 
VI. THE ROAD TO SOMEWHERE? 
The weakness of the ratio guidepost after BMW was 
obvious after even a cursory review of punitive damage opinions. 
This weakness was caused by specific second-level provisos in the 
BMW opinion that qualified ratios' applicability to such an extent 
as to render it meaningless. Largely because of this weakness of 
ratio, the BMW guideposts could truly have been said to mark a 
road to nowhere. However, that result was not terribly inconsistent 
with the BMW Court's concern for mere fair notice. On the other 
hand, when the Court shifted its focus from fair notice to non- 
arbitrariness, those second-level aspects and the weak ratio 
guidepost they created became problematic. The shift in rationale 
occurred in Cooper Industries and State Farm, but it was the latter 
161 See, e.g. ,  Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283, 293-94 (5th Cir. 2003); Diamond 
Woodworks, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 736, 761-62 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2003). 
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that began to concomitantly change the second-level provisos that 
had caused ratio's weakness and produced tension with the 
principle of non-arbitrariness. 
However, those second-level ' changes in State Farm were 
baby steps - for primacy of reprehensibility, any change was 
entirely implicit. Plainly, the Court has yet to explicitly do that 
which it has done implicitly: eschew those qualifications for ratios 
in favor of a more robust ratio guidepost. As a result, State Form's 
effect on the primacy of reprehensibility and the impossibility of 
mathematical bright lines, and therefore on the ratio guidepost 
. . itself, is very much up for grabs. However, the shift from 
reprehensibility to ratio and from a reluctance to establish bright 
. numerical lines to a fairly straightforward single-digit test is 
. necessary if the Court is to remain concerned with non- 
arbitrariness instead of fair notice. Post-State Farm courts appear 
. to have gotten the message despite the Court's inability to formally 
break with or redefine either notion. Only time will tell, but if 
State Farm proves unable to constrain capricious jury awards, it is 
likely that the analysis that Justice Scalia called the "road to 
nowhere" and "insusceptible of principled appli~at ion" '~~ will 
again come before the Court and force a clear choice between 
reprehensibility and a distrust of bright-line tests on the one hand 
and ratio and a defined numerical criterion, however nuanced, on 
the other. 
16' State Form, 538 U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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